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Abstract 
According to the popular Whole Life Satisfaction theories of happiness, an agent is 
happy when she judges that her life fulfils her ideal life-plan. Fred Feldman has 
recently argued that such views cannot accommodate the happiness of spontaneous or 
pre-occupied agents who do not consider how well their lives are going. In this paper, 
I formulate a new Whole Life Satisfaction theory which can deal with this problem. 
My proposal is inspired by Michael Smith’s advice-model of desirability. According 
to it, an agent is happy when a more informed and rational hypothetical version of her 
would judge that the agent’s actual life matches the best life-plan for her. This view 
turns out to be a flexible model which can avoid many problems of the previous 
theories of happiness. 
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1. Introduction 
The ordinary concept of ‘happiness’ is ambiguous.1 It is often merely used to describe 
how a person feels, i.e., a particular phenomenological state of the person.  This is the 
state we are in when we feel contentment, satisfaction, euphoria, and the like. Most of 
us have had direct experiences of feeling happy in this way. For instance, we usually 
feel happy when we unexpectedly see an old friend whom we haven’t seen for awhile.  
When the term ‘happiness’ is used in this first sense, nothing more is required 
for being happy than feeling happy or being in a happy mood.  Hereafter, I will use 
                                               
1 This ambiguity is recognised and elucidated in different ways by Feldman (2008, sec. 1; 2010, sec. 
1.2), Foot (2001, ch. 6), Haybron (2000, sec. 2.1; 2003, sec. 1; 2008, 5–6, sec. 2.2), Kraut (1979, p. 
168), Nettle (2005, pp. 17–20), Sizer (2010, pp. 133–134), Tatarkiewicz (1966, p. 1; 1976, pp. 1–6), 
Telfer (1980, pp. 1–2),Thomas (1968), and von Wright (1963, p. 87). Feldman (2010, pp. 131–136) 
argues against this consensus by claiming that we should instead understand ‘happiness’ as a very 
vague term. 
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the sub-indexed term ‘happinessp’ to refer to this kind of happiness.  This is because 
sometimes it is also called ‘psychological’ (or ‘local’) happiness. 
 The second sense of ‘happiness’ is often said to be ‘deeper’ than the first one.2  
It encompasses much more than mere momentary phenomenological states of agents.   
Consider a case in which a person uses drugs to in order to feel euphoric.  In such 
cases, we might hesitate to say that, as a result, this person becomes genuinely happy 
even if she feels in a certain happy way (Sizer, 2010, p. 137, and p. 139).  Happiness 
in this second sense seems to thus require more than merely having (perhaps fleeting) 
sensations of happinessp.  
We typically use the term “happiness” in this second way when we assess a 
longer period of an agent’s life.  For instance, when we talk about a person having 
been happy in the 1990s, we do not mean just that the person had many euphoric 
experiences during that decade.3  In fact, some people may feel miserable for much of 
the happy periods of their lives (Feldman, 2002, sec. 4).  For instance, consider the 
life of an Olympic athlete who undergoes a gruelling four-year training regime in 
order to prepare for the next games.  Whatever the outcome of the Olympics is for the 
athlete, it is conceivable that she later thinks of this period in her life as a happy one. 
After all, she was able to focus wholeheartedly on what she wanted.  Hereafter, I will 
use the term ‘happinessg’ to refer to happiness used in this second sense.  This is 
because sometimes this sense of happiness is also called ‘global happiness’. 
                                               
2 For methodological reasons, I cannot offer a clear-cut definition of the term ‘happiness’ when it is 
used in this second sense.  This is because I am not stipulating a new technical meaning for the term.  
Rather, the considerations in this section hopefully suggest that ‘happy’ is used in ordinary language to 
make judgments that are neither about pleasure nor about well-being.  For reasons familiar from 
Wittgenstein (1958, §65–§71) and Williamson (2007, ch. 3), I doubt whether this usage could be 
captured with any obvious and simple definition of the term.  Instead, we can investigate what the 
property of being happy could be such that it would make the core uses of the term in the ordinary 
language true.  The most popular suggestions of this property are given in section 2, and my own 
theory will be explained in section 5.  The bi-conditionals in these sections could also be understood as 
hermeneutic, non-obvious, and non-stipulative definitions of the term ‘happy’ when it is used in the 
second sense. 
3 Philippa Foot (2001, p. 85) claims that this is what Wittgenstein meant on his death-bed, when he said 
that he had had a wonderful life. 
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In addition, some philosophers use the term ‘happiness’ in a third sense 
(Feldman, 2008, p. 219).  When they talk about the happiness of an agent, all they 
mean is that the agent is living a good life.  Furthermore, they understand a life to be a 
good life when it has a high level of well-being (or a lot of ‘prudential value’).  I will 
use the sub-indexed expression ‘happinessw-b’ for this third use of the term 
‘happiness’.  It is also sometimes called ‘eudaimonic happiness’ or ‘prudential 
happiness’.4 
I will assume hereafter that this third sense of ‘happiness’ is distinct from the 
other two senses of the term.  It seems conceivable that a person’s life can be happy in 
the other two senses even if her life lacks the normal constituents of well-being.5 For 
instance, it is often thought that, the further we go back in the history, the lower the 
level of general well-being was.  Despite this, it is reasonable to think that people 
were not necessarily less happyp, or even happyg.  
 
So, to summarise, it seems like being happyg requires more than just feeling happy 
(i.e., being happyp).  Yet, it does not seem to necessarily require as much as living a 
life with a high level of well-being (i.e., being happyw-b).  My main goal is then to 
consider what is required for happinessg.  What could the middle-ground between 
happinessp and happinessw-b be?  What constitutes being happy in that sense?  
I will begin by introducing, in section 2, different versions of the most popular 
theory of happinessg – the so-called Whole Life Satisfaction theory.6  Section 3 will 
then explain Fred Feldman’s recent counter-examples to all the different versions of 
                                               
4 Foot (2001, ch. 6), Murphy (2008), and Taylor (2002) are some of the philosophers who use 
‘happiness’ in this sense.  
5 However, Crisp (2006, ch. 4) argues that happinessw-b consists of instances of happinessp. 
6 In different forms, these views has been defended, for example, by Benditt (1974), Brandt (1967), 
Kekes (1982), Kraut (1979), Montague (1966), Nozick (1989), Sumner (1996, pp. 145–146), 
Tatarkiewicz (1966),  Telfer (1980, pp. 8–9), Thomas (1968), and von Wright (1963, pp. 98–99).  
Whole Life Satisfaction models are also often used in empirical research (see, for instance, Veenhoven 
(1984)). 
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that theory (Feldman, 2008; Feldman, 2010, ch. 5).  Section 3 also argues that these 
cases are based on the so-called conditional fallacy, which is a typical flaw in 
philosophical theories based on subjunctive conditionals. 
Section 4 will then look at how the conditional fallacy has been solved by 
Michael Smith in the context of theories of desirability which have often been based 
on subjunctive conditionals (Smith, 1995, sec.1).  By using Smith’s ‘advice-model’, I 
will then construct, in section 5, a Whole Life Satisfaction theory with a new and 
improved structure.  I will argue that the resulting theories of happiness with the 
‘advice-structure’ will be able to avoid Feldman’s objections to the Whole Life 
Satisfaction theories.  Finally, section 6 will discuss some of the advantages of the 
resulting view and respond to some of the objections to it. 
 
2. The Whole Life Satisfaction Theories of Happiness 
So, why isn’t being happy during a longer period of time neither a matter of just 
feeling happy nor of merely living a life with a high level of objective well-being?  
According to the most popular theory of happinessg, this is because at the heart of 
happiness lies the agent’s own conception of how her life is going. 
The idea is that everyone has a set of goals.  Even if some of these goals 
change at different stages of our life, they still tend to be fairly stable.  In the past and 
the present, we have either achieved some of our goals, or we would have wanted to 
have done so.7  And, the rest of our goals we will want to achieve in the future.  The 
plans that lead to satisfying as many of these goals as possible during the different 
stages of our lives can be said to constitute our ‘ideal life-plans’. 
 We also typically have some conception of what has happened to us in our 
lives, and we have some beliefs about what will happen to us in the future.  In this 
                                               
7 It is worth pointing out that many of these goals are to engage in a variety of activities rather than to 
bring about some end-state.  Because of this, the resulting life-plans might be more a matter of living in 
certain ways rather than accomplishing certain feats. 
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situation, we can make judgments about whether our lives match up with our ideal 
life-plan.  These judgments form the essence of Whole Life Satisfaction theories. 
 Even if it is possible to formulate almost infinitely many different versions of 
the Whole Life Satisfaction theory from the previous core idea, I will focus here on 
the three main alternatives.  They all develop, in slightly different ways, the 
platitudinous ideas that a person is happy when she is satisfied with her life. 
 
(i) Cognitive Whole Life Satisfaction Theories.8  A simple version of a Cognitive 
Whole Life Satisfaction theory might claim that:9 
(CWLS) A person, S, is happyg to degree n at time t if and only if:  
(i) there is a certain life which S has lived up to t,  
(ii) at t, S has an ideal life-plan for her life,  
(iii) at t, S has a moderately detailed conception of how her life has 
transpired so far, and  
(iv) at t, S judges that her actual life so far matches her ideal life-
plan to degree n. 
According to this proposal, being happyg consists of being in a cognitive state which 
represents how well one’s actual life matches up to one’s life-plan.  As a result, 
according to CWLS, one cannot be happy without actually believing that one’s life 
satisfies one’s ideal life-plan.  
 Accounts like CWLS may seem at least somewhat plausible.  I have a 
conception of what an ideal life for me would be like.  This plan might consist of 
having a safe childhood, getting a good education, having friends and a family, having 
a meaningful career, and so on.  If I also believe that so far my life, by and large, fits 
this plan, then it seems reasonable to believe that I am happy. 
                                               
8 Versions of this view have been defended by Kekes (1982), Thomas (1968, pp. 104–108), and von 
Wright (1963, pp. 98–99). 
9 My way of formulating all the theories of this manuscript is based on Feldman (2008; 2010, ch. 5). 
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 CWLS also has another advantage (Feldman, 2008, sec. 4; Feldman, 2010, 
sec. 5.4).  We can create many different versions of this simple view.  Each one of 
them will classify agents as happy in slightly different ways.  We can change how 
complete the agent’s life-plan must be, how accurate a conception she must have 
about her actual life, whether all aspects of her life must fit the plan or only the most 
important ones, whether the judgment in clause (iv) must be about the whole life or a 
part of it, and so on.  By changing these aspects of the theory, we can seek a reflective 
equilibrium between CWLS and our intuitive judgments about which agents are 
happy. 
 
(ii) Affective Whole Life Satisfaction Theories.  According to some people, CWLS 
cannot be the correct account of happiness, because it would make happiness too 
intellectual, i.e., merely a matter of believing.10  On their view, whether one feels 
pleased with how one lives is more important than any beliefs could ever be.  Hence, 
according to the views based on this idea, happiness is a specific kind of positive 
affective state based on one’s conception of one’s life.  This causal origin of the 
relevant feeling of contentment is then taken to distinguish happinessg from the mere 
feelings of happinessp. 
It is worth emphasising that, according to these views, the relevant affective 
state must at least result from the agent’s implicit and vague assessment of how well 
her life is going overall. However, on these views, the prior cognitive judgments that 
must prompt one to have the relevant positive attitudes are not themselves 
constituents of happinessg. 
                                               
10 This objection is explained by Haybron (2007, sec. 2; 2008, pp. 14–16). 
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 I will call the views of this kind Affective Whole Life Satisfaction views.11 
One formulation of such a view might claim that: 
(AWLS): A person, S, is happyg to degree n at time t if and only if:  
(i) there is a certain life that S has lived up until t, and  
(ii) at t, S takes pleasure of degree n in the fact that she has lived 
that life so far. 
 
(iii) Hybrid Whole Life Satisfaction Theories.  Finally, there can be hybrid views 
according to which happinessg requires both a cognitive judgment of how one’s life 
matches up to one’s life-plan and a positive affective state based on that judgment.12  
One such Hybrid Whole Life Satisfaction view might claim that: 
(HWLS): A person, S, is happyg to degree n= f(p, q) at time t if and only if:  
(i) there is a certain life which S has actually lived up to t,  
(ii) at t, S has an ideal life-plan for her life,  
(iii) at t, S has a moderately detailed conception of how her life has 
transpired so far,  
(iv) at t, S judges that her actual life matches her ideal life-plan to 
degree p, and 
(v) at t, S takes pleasure of degree q in her judgment that her life 
measures up to her life-plan to the degree p. 
Thus, according to HWLS, the degree of one’s happinessg (expressed by ‘n’) is a 
function of two variables (‘f(p, q)’): the degree to which one believes that one’s life 
matches one’s life-plan (‘p’), and the strength of the positive attitude that results from 
                                               
11 Different versions of this view have been defended by Tatarkiewicz (1966), Telfer (1980, pp. 8–9), 
and perhaps Montague (1966, p. 96). See also Haybron (2008, p. 82). 
12 Views of this type have been defended by, for instance, Brandt (1967, pp. 413–414), and Sumner 
(1996, p. 145). 
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that belief (‘q’).  And, again, one could further specify different versions of HWLS by 
changing its variables in different ways. 
 
Admittedly, CWLS, AWLS, and HWLS are simplified theories of happiness.  In order 
to be plausible, they should be developed further in many ways.  However, Fred 
Feldman has recently argued that all theories with the same structure as these theories 
will face insurmountable problems.  In the next section, I will explain what these 
problems are and how they seriously challenge the plausibility of CWLS.  I will 
return to AWLS and HWLS in the end of section 5.   
 
3. Feldman’s Dilemma 
There is both an ‘actualist’ and a ‘hypotheticalist’ version of CWLS.  Feldman has 
argued that both of those theories will lead to implausible conclusions about who is 
happy (Feldman, 2008, p. 230; Feldman, 2010, sec. 5.5). 
 I formulated CWLS in the actualist way above.  According to that formulation, 
being happyg requires that one has actually (a) formed a life-plan and a conception of 
how one’s life has transpired so far, and (b) compared the two.  Feldman has argued 
that these requirements make being happy in the second sense too demanding (2008, 
pp. 230–232; 2010, pp. 82–84).13 
It seems intuitive that one can be happy without having formed a life-plan or a 
detailed conception of what has happened in one’s life, let alone without having made 
any comparisons between the two.  It is reasonable to claim that anyone who is 
unreflective in this way could be just as happy as someone who has extensively 
compared their life-plan with their actual life.14   
                                               
13 See Haybron (2008, pp. 85–86) for more on this ‘problem of attitudinal scarcity’.  Haybron (2007; 
2008, ch. 5) offers also many other objections to actualist versions of Whole Life Satisfaction views.  
14 Note that the unreflective persons can be experiencing a lot of pleasure, and their lives can score high 
on the objective measures of well-being. This means that these individuals can be both happyp and 
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There is also a risk that the actualist CWLS makes certain central varieties of 
happinessg unattainable for actual human beings (Feldman, 2004, pp. 231–232; 2010, 
p. 82).  Consider a case in which the actualist CWLS is used to assess how happyg 
someone’s life is overall from her birth to her death.  In this case, the previous theory 
would require that, in order for the agent to be happyg, she would have to be capable 
of forming a sufficiently comprehensive awareness of her whole life from its very 
first day to its end.  Feldman seems to be right when he claims that actual human 
beings are probably not able to form such awareness (ibid.). Hence, one consequence 
of the actualist CWLS seems to be that no actual human being could live a happy life. 
This certainly seems to be a problematic consequence of the theory.  
One could try to avoid these problems by creating a hypotheticalist Whole 
Life Satisfaction Theory (Feldman, 2008, p. 234; Feldman, 2010, p. 86).  Such a view 
might claim that: 
(HYWLS): A person, S, is happyg to degree n at time t if and only if:  
(i) there is a certain life which S has lived up to t, and 
(ii) if, at t, S were to form an ideal life-plan for her life, and  
(iii) if, at t, S were to form a moderately detailed conception of how her life 
has transpired so far, then, 
(iv) at t, S would judge that her actual life matches her ideal life-plan to 
degree n. 
On this view, being happyg does not require that one actually has formed a 
life-plan and a conception of one’s actual life, and made a judgment of how the two 
match up.   Rather, all it takes for one to be happyg according to HYWLS is that a 
                                                                                                                                      
happyw-b. This will pose no theoretical problems for any plausible theories of happinessp and 
happinessw-b. This is because self-reflection is presumably not a central constituent of either pleasure or 
objective well-being. Thus, the happiness of self-reflective agents is only a problem for the Whole Life 
Satisfaction theories of happinessg that require certain actual judgments for an agent to be happy. One 
alternative for a defender of the Whole Life Satisfaction theory of happiness would be to bite the bullet 
here and to claim such agents are not happyg even if they can be happyp and happyw-b.  
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certain subjunctive conditional is true of one.  It requires only that, if one were to 
form a life-plan and a conception of one’s actual life, then one would judge that the 
two match up.  This allows unreflective people to be happy because the subjunctive 
conditional can be true even if its antecedent is false.  Even if a person never self-
reflected, it could be true that, if she did so, she would judge that her life fits her ideal 
life-plan. 
 
However, Fred Feldman (2008, pp. 234–237; 2010, pp. 87–89) has argued HYWLS 
faces serious problems of its own, and I am inclined to agree with him about this.  In 
order to illustrate these problems, Feldman introduces two characters to argue for this 
conclusion: an unreflective Timmy and a contemplative philosopher.  
Timmy is consistently active and cheerful.  This is because he is always 
engaged in activities that he enjoys.  What is special about Timmy is that he never 
thinks about his own life at all.  According to Feldman, it could be true of Timmy in 
this situation that, if he began to consider his ideal life-plans and his actual life, he 
would come to judge that his whole life is worthless (Feldman, 2004, p. 235).  This 
could be in part because he might make false judgments about his situation, in part 
because he might come to hold a demanding conception of an ideal life and find that 
his life is nothing like that, and in part because he might find the whole business of 
self-reflection itself very depressing.    
As a result, according to HYWLS, Timmy cannot be happy.  However, this 
seems to conflict our basic intuitions about Timmy’s happiness.  Most of us would 
want to claim that Timmy does seem to be happy just as he is – he is cheerful and 
engages in the activities which he likes.  So, this example shows that the subjunctive 
conditional, which HYWLS uses to measure happiness, does not seem to track our 
intuitions about which agents are happy. 
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 In Feldman’s second example, the philosopher is deeply engrossed in 
philosophical deliberation.  Because of this, she would not think about her own life 
unless someone interrupted her.  If someone did this, the philosopher would stop 
thinking about philosophy and start thinking about her own life.  This would be 
annoying for the philosopher. 
 If the philosopher would then form a life-plan and a conception of her life in 
these counterfactual circumstances in which she is very annoyed, she might come to 
conclude that her life is not going according to her plan.  Instead of philosophising, 
she would now spend time thinking about her own life.  As a result, in the light of the 
subjunctive conditional of HYWLS, the philosopher is not actually happy.  Yet, 
intuitively, there is no reason why she would not be happy now in the actual life in 
which she is thinking about philosophy and not about her life.  After all, it is that life 
we are evaluating and not the counterfactual situation in which her philosophical 
contemplation has been interrupted.15 
 
These cases suggest that the hypothetical HYWLS also has unintuitive consequences.  
We should notice, however, that these cases are so effective because they reveal the 
so-called conditional fallacy committed by HYWLS.  This fallacy is a well-known 
problem for philosophical accounts based on subjunctive conditionals.16  The problem 
with such accounts is that, when we assess a subjunctive conditional, realising the 
counterfactual antecedent of the conditional analysans can change the assessed state 
                                               
15 The previous two examples are directly from Feldman (2008, pp. 234–237; 2010, pp. 87–89).   I 
have not changed them, because I hope that they enable the reader to assess how well my own Whole 
Life Satisfaction theory can respond to Feldman’s objections as they were presented.  However, it is 
possible to imagine more vivid cases.  Consider the world’s best tennis players, Formula 1 drivers, and 
fighter pilots.  Such activities require extreme focus.  It might well be that, if these individuals would 
reflect on their lives, they would lose focus and begin to lose matches, crash cars, and be shot down.  
So, if these individuals were to form judgments about their lives, their lives would change for the 
worse.  As a result, in the counter-factual, self-reflective circumstances, they would judge their lives 
not to fulfil their plans.  According to HYWLS, the truth of this counter-factual would mean that the 
tennis players, Formula 1 drivers, and fighter pilots are not happy even when they are pursuing their 
careers successfully (because they do not self-reflect).  This seems implausible to me. 
16 My presentation of the fallacy follows Wright (1992, p. 118). See also Shope (1978). 
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of affairs.  If an agent were to form a life-plan, her life would be different from the 
one that we are trying to evaluate.  
The crux of the fallacy is that the changes made in the assessed states of 
affairs can impinge on the truth-value of our assessments.  We cannot rule out that the 
changed life would be less happy or happier than the one we were originally 
assessing.  In the previous cases, we wanted to assess the happiness of spontaneous 
and philosophising lives, but our account forced us to assess self-reflective lives 
instead.  And, there is no guarantee that the latter lives are as happy as the former.17 
Yet, there are ways in which one can try to reformulate a theory based on a 
subjunctive conditional so as to avoid the conditional fallacy.  In the next section, I 
will explain one such attempt from the familiar debates about desirability. 
 
Before that, it is worthwhile to briefly consider how happyp and happyw-b Timmy and 
the philosopher are, and what kind of theoretical implications this might have.  
Intuitively, Timmy is happyp because of all the pleasure he experiences during his 
spontaneous activities. The philosopher is a more difficult case with respect to 
happinessp. It may be that she does not experience any specific sensation of bliss 
whilst philosophising. However, she might still be in a state of consciousness she 
desires to be in. The former consideration entails that the so-called internalist theories 
of happinessp would not classify the philosopher as happyp, whereas the latter fact 
entails that the so-called externalist theories would classify her as happyp.   
 We can also stipulate that both Timmy and the philosopher are happyw-b by the 
lights of the standard theories of happinessw-b.  According to the so-called ‘success 
theories’ of happinessw-b, a person is happyw-b when her core desires are successfully 
                                               
17 Of course, we can also consider how happyp and happyw-b Timmy and the Philosopher are.  
Intuitively, Timmy is happyp because of all the pleasure he experiences from his activities. The 
Philosopher is a harder case. It may be that he does not experience any specific sensation of bliss, but 
still he is in a state of consciousness he wants to be in. This means  
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satisfied.  Timmy’s desires change constantly because he finds different enjoyable 
activities appealing at different times.  However, he still always succeeds in satisfying 
these desires. The philosopher desires only to continue her philosophical 
investigations, and she succeeds in doing so. For these reasons, both Timmy and the 
philosopher are happyw-b according to the success theories. 
 The so-called ‘objective list’ theories of happinessw-b claim that happinessw-b 
consists of having certain goods that are necessary preconditions for being able to 
pursue any reasonable conception of a good life. These goods may include wealth, 
health, knowledge, important relationships, autonomy, and so on. We can stipulate 
that both Timmy and the philosopher have a sufficient amount of these goods.18 
Therefore, according to the objective list theories too, they both count as happyw-b.  
 
This suggests one potential way in which the Whole Life Satisfaction theories of 
happiness might deal with Feldman’s objection.  It could be claimed that, when we 
consider Timmy’s and the philosopher’s happiness, our intuitions are really about 
either happinessp or happinessw-b.  We have just confused these intuitions for our 
beliefs about how happyg these agents are. This would mean that HYWLS’s judgment 
that Timmy and the philosopher are unhappyg could still be correct without 
conflicting with our intuitive judgments about happiness which in this case happen to 
be about the other two senses of happiness. 
 I am not convinced that this proposal could deal with the objection. It seems 
that we can intentionally concentrate on the ordinary sense of happiness that is neither 
about the amount of pleasurable experiences nor about the objective level of well-
being.  When we focus on this kind of happiness, many of us would probably want to 
                                               
18 According to some objective list theories, happinessp and/or happinessg also belong to the 
constituents of happinessw-b. This might make it true that, depending on our views on happinessp and 
happinessg, Timmy and the philosopher might not be completely happyw-b even if they are considerably 
happyw-b because they have all the other relevant goods. This makes no difference in what follows 
below.  
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believe that Timmy and the Philosopher are happy individuals in this very sense of 
happiness.  This would entail that HYWLS still conflicts with our intuitions.  If this 
were true, then we should continue to attempt to formulate a theory of happinessg that 
better fits our considered judgments about happiness in this sense. I formulate such a 
theory in the next section. 
 
4. Desirability, the Conditional Fallacy, and the Advice-Model 
Many philosophers have tried to account for desirability in terms of subjunctive 
conditionals (Rawls, 1971, ch. 7; Brandt, 1979, ch.1).19  They are motivated by the 
thought that, even if we usually desire what is intuitively desirable, sometimes we 
may fail to do so.  Even if I desire to drink the liquid from the glass in front of me, 
that liquid may not actually be desirable because, unbeknownst to me, it is petrol 
rather than gin.20  Likewise, drinking gin might not be desirable even if I happen to 
desire to drink it, because I have a more fundamental desire to work tomorrow. 
 A natural way to avoid such problems is to give an account of desirability in 
terms of what one would desire in a counterfactual situation in which one were fully 
rational.  On the resulting views based on subjunctive conditionals, something is 
desirable if and only if it is what one would desire if one had all the relevant 
information and one’s desires were made coherent.  If I knew that there was petrol in 
the glass, I would not want to drink it.  This is why drinking the liquid from the glass 
in front of me is not desirable now.  Likewise, if my desires were made coherent, my 
desire to drink gin might disappear because of my more fundamental desires. 
 We can then generate counterexamples to the previous subjunctive account of 
desirability by using the idea behind the conditional fallacy introduced above (Smith, 
1995, p. 111).  Imagine that you have just lost a game of squash.  Is it desirable that 
                                               
19 Similar theories about reasons have been defended by Darwall (1984, pp. 80–82), Falk (1990, pp. 
36–39), Korsgaard (1986, p. 15), and Williams (1981). 
20 These examples are from Williams (1981). 
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you go shake hands with your opponent?  Let us assume that, when you lose, you 
become so angry that, if you go shake hands with your opponent, you will hit her.  
Yet, if you were rational, you would not do so.  You would know how much being hit 
hurts and the process of making your desires coherent would have got rid of your 
desire to hit the opponent.  As a result, you would remain cool, calm, and collected. 
 So, according to the view of desirability based on the subjunctive conditional, 
it is desirable for you also in the actual situation to shake hands with your opponent.   
However, given that you will hit the opponent in that case, it is hard to see what 
would be desirable about the action you are contemplating.  This again is an instance 
of the conditional fallacy.  That we make the antecedent of the subjunctive conditional 
true when we assess the whole conditional changes the circumstances that we are 
supposed to be assessing.  As a result, we cannot bring our conclusions about the 
desirability of the given action in the counterfactual case to the real circumstances that 
we are assessing. 
 Michael Smith has formulated a theory of desirability which can avoid the 
previous conditional fallacy (Smith, 1995, sec. 1; see also Railton, 1986, p. 174).21  
Smith makes a distinction between the evaluated state of affairs of the actual agent, 
and the evaluating world in which the agent’s hypothetical fully rational self is 
located.  We then determine whether something is desirable in the actual 
circumstances by considering whether the rational version of the agent (living in the 
evaluating world) would want the actual agent to act in a certain way in the evaluated 
circumstances. 
So, in the previous case, A considers in the actual world whether to go shake 
hands with her opponent.  She has a counterpart A+ in the evaluating world with an 
                                               
21 Robert Johnson (1999) has argued that Smith’s proposal cannot both avoid the conditional fallacy 
and be an internalist view of desirability in the desired sense. That is, the resulting view will no longer 
have room for a direct connection between what is desirable and what we are motivated to pursue. 
However, Johnson does not contest that Smith’s view does manage to avoid the conditional fallacy. 
 16 
informed and coherent version of her desires.  Instead of asking what A+ would want 
herself to do, we ask what would A+ want A to do in the real world.  Presumably, A+ 
would not want A to go shake hands with her opponent. She knows that A would only 
hit her opponent.  This means that Smith’s advice-model gives the right conclusion.  It 
is not desirable for A to go shake hands with her opponent because, when thinking 
about this from the evaluating world, the idealised version of A would not want A to 
do so in the evaluated circumstances.  
 It is clear why this theory avoids the conditional fallacy.  That we have two 
separate perspectives – the evaluated and the evaluating world – guarantees that 
making the antecedent of the subjunctive conditional true in the evaluating world 
cannot affect the evaluated real circumstances.  Because of this, Smith’s view is 
immune to the conditional fallacy. The changes we make to the evaluating world 
cannot affect the circumstances of the real world that are being evaluated.  This is 
why the truth-value of our assessments cannot be distorted by these changes. 
 
5. The ‘Advice Version’ of the Whole Life Satisfaction Theories of Happiness 
The same move can be made to save HYWLS from Feldman’s counterexamples.22  
The resulting ‘advice version’ of the Hypothetical Whole Life Satisfaction view could 
claim that: 
(ADHYWLS) A person, S, is happyg to degree n at time t if and only if:  
(i) there is a certain life which S has lived up to t in the evaluated 
circumstances, and 
(ii) if, at t, an idealised version of S, S+, were to form an ideal life-plan for 
S’s life, and  
                                               
22 Feldman (2008, p. 236; 2010, p. 88) comes close to formulating something like this proposal on the 
basis of Valerie Tiberius’s (unpublished) work. I will address the objections which he might be 
presenting to this view below (sec. 6.v) 
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(iii) if, at t, S+ were to form a moderately detailed conception of how S’s 
life in the evaluated circumstances has transpired so far, then, 
(iv) at t, S+ would judge that S’s actual life matches S+’s ideal life-plan for 
S to degree n. 
The basic idea of this proposal is the same as the one behind Smith’s theory of 
desirability. Consider the following example.  We are trying to assess how happy Ann 
is.  She lives in the evaluated actual circumstances.  We can then imagine an idealised 
version of Ann, Ann+, looking at Ann’s life from the hypothetical evaluating 
circumstances.  Ann+ shares Ann’s likes and dislikes.  She also knows what Ann 
wants and values during different stages of her life.  On the basis of this information, 
Ann+ can formulate an ideal life-plan for Ann.  If Ann’s actual life went according to 
this plan, she would be engaged in activities which she likes and her desires would be 
satisfied. 
 Ann+ will also be informed about what has happened in Ann’s life so far.  
Ann+ will therefore be able to make an informed judgment about the degree to which 
Ann’s life matches up with her life-plan for Ann.  ADHYWLS then claims that Ann is 
happy in the actual world at a given time if and only if Ann+ would judge that Ann’s 
life at that point meets the standards set by the ideal life-plan which Ann+ has for Ann. 
 
This proposal avoids Feldman’s objections to both the actualist CWLS and the 
hypotheticalist HYWLS.  ADHYWLS does not require that the agent whose 
happiness is assessed actually forms any life-plans or beliefs about how her life 
matches those plans. Rather, ADHYWLS is based only on a purely hypothetical 
judgment which an imaginary version of the given agent could make. So, the 
objections to the actualist CWLS do not apply to this view. 
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 It is equally obvious that the objections to the hypotheticalist HYWLS do not 
apply to this view either.  Consider first unreflective Timmy.  According to 
ADHYWLS, in assessing his happiness, we do not need to consider what Timmy 
himself would make of his life.  Rather, we first imagine a more rational version of 
Timmy who knows Timmy’s likes and dislikes (and his desires, values, and the like).  
Because of this knowledge, the idealised Timmy+ can come to believe that the best 
life-plan for Timmy in the real world just is to live spontaneously.  Any self-reflection 
from his actual counterpart would merely be counterproductive.  For this reason, the 
life-plan which Timmy+ would have for Timmy would not contain any such 
reflection.  
According to the ideal life-plan then, Timmy should not think about his life.  
Rather, to follow this plan, Timmy should simply continue to take part in the activities 
he enjoys.  Timmy+ can therefore come to judge that Timmy’s actual life meets the 
standards of the ideal life-plan he has for Timmy.  As a result, this view can provide 
the right intuitive conclusion according to which Timmy is happyg in the real life. 
 The same can be said about the contemplative philosopher.  We can imagine a 
hypothetical, idealised version of her.  This philosopher+ knows that the actual 
philosopher likes being immersed in philosophising and hates thinking about her own 
life.  As a result, the philosopher+ can formulate an ideal life-plan for the philosopher 
that includes lot of philosophising and little self-reflection.  The philosopher+ can then 
judge that the actual philosopher’s life actually satisfies the ideal life-plan which she 
has for her actual version.  This means that ADHYWLS gives the right intuitive 
conclusion about the philosopher’s happiness. 
 Thus, unlike the previous Whole Life Satisfaction views, ADHYWLS is 
immune to Feldman’s counterexamples. Those counterexamples were based on the 
conditional fallacy, which many accounts based on subjunctive conditionals commit. 
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The problem with these views is that making the antecedent of the relevant 
subjunctive conditionals true interferes with the circumstances we are trying to assess. 
Yet, if we make Smith’s distinction between the evaluated and the evaluating 
perspectives, this interference cannot happen. The antecedent of the counterfactual is 
made true only in the hypothetical, evaluating circumstances from which the 
unchanged actual circumstances are then evaluated. This is why assessing the 
subjunctive conditionals of ADHYWLS does not distort the truth-value of the 
assessed happiness-claims. 
 
At this point, it is worth saying something about AWLS and HWLS – the affective 
and hybrid versions of the Whole Life Satisfaction theories.  These views too are 
vulnerable to Feldman’s counterexamples.  According to AWLS, Timmy cannot be 
happy because he cannot be feeling satisfaction on the basis of having a sense of how 
well his life is going.  As an unreflective person, Timmy has no sense at all about this.  
Likewise, Timmy cannot be happy according to HWLS, because that would require 
that he had formulated a life-plan, a conception of his life, made a judgment of how 
the two match up, and felt satisfaction as a result.  He has done none of these things.  
 Furthermore, the hypotheticalist versions of AWLS and HWLS would also 
commit the conditional fallacy.  In the counterfactual situations which would be 
specified by those views, Timmy would not feel satisfaction about his new life in 
which he is made to self-reflect.  As a result, even the actual Timmy would not count 
as happy. 
 Finally, it’s not clear whether the defenders of these views could avoid these 
problems by adopting the advice-model introduced above.  Both of these views are 
motivated by the thought that one constituent of happinessg must be certain positive 
attitudes; feelings of satisfaction and the like.  If we tried to use the advice-model to 
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revise AWLS or HWLS, the result would be that one requirement for being happyg 
would be that an idealised version of a person would experience satisfaction as a 
result of comparing her actual life to her ideal life-plan.  
However, it would be strange if such a hypothetical feeling of satisfaction 
would be required for actual happiness.  So, it would not make sense to use the 
advice-model to develop AWLS or HWLS in order to avoid Feldman’s counter-
examples. Rather, I will try to explain in the next section how ADHYWLS itself can 
be used to capture why feeling satisfied is often an important part of happinessg (sec. 
6.ii).  
 
6. Some Advantages of ADHYWLS and Responses to Objections 
In this concluding section, I will first sketch some advantages of ADHYWLS as a 
theory of happinessg. I acknowledge that these advantages do not amount to a full 
argument for the view.23  I will then conclude by responding to some potential 
objections to ADHYWLS. 
 
(i) Flexibility. The first advantage of ADHYWLS is that it offers a flexible structure 
for many different theories of happinessg. The first form of flexibility is temporal. 
ADHYWLS is an account of what is required for being happy during a certain period 
of time. Let us assume that this period, t, is shorter than the agent’s whole life but 
longer than a mere fleeting moment.  
In this situation, one version of ADHYWLS would claim that A is happyg 
during t if and only if A+ would judge that A’s life during t matches up with the 
corresponding period of A+’s ideal life-plan for A.  Other versions might claim that, 
for A to be happyg during t, it is required that A’s life matches up with A+’s life-plan 
                                               
23 So, I make no claims that this proposal is, for instance, definitely superior to Haybron’s emotional 
state conception of happiness defended in Haybron (2008).  
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for her not only during t but also during some period before t (and maybe even for 
some time after t too).24 
A second source of flexibility comes from the fact that ADHYWLS can 
accommodate different kinds of idealisations of agents, and different ways in which 
they would construct the relevant life-plans.  According to the simplest option, A+ 
would merely be aware of the complete sets of A’s wants, likes, desires, intentions, 
goals, and values (hereafter ‘conative attitudes’) during different periods of her life.25 
A+ would then devise a plan that would maximise the number of how many of these 
attitudes would be satisfied throughout A’s life.  
Alternatively, A+ could device a life-plan that would only lead to the 
satisfaction of A’s strongest, most deeply held and integrated conative attitudes.   
These two views would disagree about whether satisfying merely trivial desires could 
make one happyg. 
It is also possible to make the ideal life-plans devised by the advisors even 
more idealised.  For instance, following Smith, one could think that A+ would have an 
informed and coherent version of A’s set of conative attitudes.  We could then 
consider what kind of a life-plan A+ would form for A on the basis of that idealised 
set.  The resulting theory would claim that a happyg life needs to be a desirable life in 
Smith’s sense.  In this case, one could not become happierg by spending nights at the 
pub, if we assume that one’s ideal self would not plan these nights for one.  The 
idealised self would know how bad one’s hang-overs would be, and how one’s desire 
                                               
24 If t is agent’s whole life, then presumably A+ must compare A’s whole life to the ideal life-plan. 
Feldman (2010, pp. 91–97) explores the advantages and difficulties of the different temporal 
formulations of the Whole Life Satisfaction views. Haybron (2001, p. 510) emphasises the forward 
looking aspect of happiness.   
25 Kraut (1979, pp. 178–179) and Haybron (2007, sec. 3.1) emphasise that it is important that the 
agent’s moral and evaluative beliefs are also included in the input for the ideal life-plans.  One 
advantage of the advice-model is that the idealised version of the agent can, by balancing them, find a 
coherent combination of the ethical perspectives which the actual agent can take towards her life.  This 
solves many of the problems related to the arbitrariness of actual Life Satisfaction assessments (see 
Haybron, 2008, ch. 5, sec. 5). 
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to go to the pub conflicts with one’s more fundamental desires to work the following 
days.26 
 We could even require that the advisor would be informed about all objective 
evaluative facts about what constitutes a good life.  She would then form the ideal-
plan for the agent, not only on the basis of the agent’s conative attitudes, but also on 
the basis of which lives would be objectively good for the agent.  According to this 
version of ADHYWLS, one could not live a happyg life unless one’s life had a high 
level of objective well-being.  It would not be possible to live a happy life, according 
to this view, that consisted of mainly counting blades of grass.27 
 Finally, some views of happinessg might claim that living a happy life requires 
that one’s life has a certain narrative ‘shape’ (Annas, 2004, pp. 47–48).28  According 
to these views, all happy lives must develop in overlapping and interrelated stages.  
Such lives must include overarching projects, obstacles to satisfying them, 
development of skills, helpers and enemies, instances of overcoming difficulties, and 
the like.  The corresponding version of ADHYWLS would insist that the life-plans 
formulated by the agents’ ideal selves would also need to have a certain story-like 
structure.  
Alternative accounts would accept that people who live episodic lives with no 
narrative structure can be just as happyg (Feldman 2004, ch. 6; Feldman, 2010, pp. 
175–177; Strawson, 2008, sec. 10).  According to their version of ADHYWLS, the 
ideal life-plans for some people can consist of different unconnected episodes lived in 
                                               
26 This would admittedly make happinessg more objective, and less dependent on the agent’s own 
attitudes. 
27 This would weaken the Personal Authority which individuals are often thought to have over the 
question of their happiness, i.e., this would make happiness less transparent for individuals (Haybron, 
2008, p. 13; but see Feldman (2010, ch. 11) for an objection).  Someone might also add that a happyg 
life must be a morally virtuous life. In this case, an ideal life-plan for anyone would necessarily be a 
virtuous life.  On this view, evil people could not be happy (Foot, 2001, p. 92).  Such views would be 
influenced by Aristotle’s discussions of ‘eudaimonia’ (Kraut, 1979, pp. 174 –176, and sec. 4).  Kraut 
(1979) argues convincingly why the ideal-life plans relevant for happiness should not include objective 
facts about virtuous life. 
28 Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming) argues that a narrative shape is a requirement for having a 
‘meaningful’ life. 
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completely different ways.  These views would allow people who do not experience 
their lives as narratives to be just as happy anyone else. 
 There thus seems to be uncountably many versions of ADHYWLS.  This is an 
advantage.  The next stage in developing ADHYWLS would be to compare which 
one of the possible versions of the view mentioned above best fits our intuitions about 
who is happy.29  In this way, we could reach a reflective equilibrium between our 
considered judgments about the happiness of different agents and our philosophical 
theory of happinessg. 
 
(ii) Happinessg, Happinessp, and Happinessw-b.  Could ADHYWLS provide a 
plausible account of the relations between the different forms of happiness?  Above, I 
claimed that feeling happy (i.e., happinessp) does not always seem to be necessary or 
sufficient for being happyg. Yet, in considering the motivation for AWLS and HWLS 
above, I admitted that feeling happy does often seem to make people happierg. Can 
ADHYWLS accommodate both of these claims? 
 First, it is easy to see why feeling happy is not always necessary for being 
happyg on this view.  An ascetic person may not desire, like, or value feeling happy, 
euphoric, satisfied, and so on.  If an ideal version of this person formulated a life-plan 
for her, this plan would not include many hedonic experiences.  As a result, such a 
person would not be happyg on the basis of feeling happy (Haybron, 2008, p. 84).  
 Of course, most ordinary people do desire, like, and value hedonic 
experiences.  So, the ideal life-plans which their advisors would create for them 
would include having these experiences often.  Therefore, these individuals would be 
                                               
29 There is also another sense in which the view is theoretically neutral.  ADHYWLS is formulated as a 
bi-conditional according to which the property of being happyg and the property of living a life which 
matches up to one’s ideal life-plan are necessarily co-instantiated.  This bi-conditional itself is neutral 
about whether the theory should be understood as a conceptual analysis of ‘happiness’, as a theory of 
the constitution of the property of happinessg, as a theory of what makes one happy, as a theory of what 
is merely a reliable indicator of happiness, and so on.  
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happierg the more they experienced feelings of happiness, pleasure, satisfaction, and 
the like.  This is why, according to ADHYWLS, feeling happy can generally make 
most people happyg, at least to some degree. 
 It is worth emphasising that people can also desire experiences of happiness 
with a specific causal origin.  I may desire the feeling of happiness that I get from 
smelling flowers but not that which would be induced by drugs.  This is why, 
according to ADHYWLS, I would not be made happierg by taking drugs that made 
me feel euphoric.  
 I also claimed earlier that it is possible to be happyg without living a life with a 
high level of well-being (see also Haybron, 2003, sec. 4.3). This will be true only if 
we assume an objectivist view of well-being.30  These views claim that there are 
universal constituents of well-being which can be listed.31  They might include, for 
instance, wealth, knowledge, health, pleasure, autonomy, friendship, parenting, food, 
shelter, meaningful work, virtue and perfection of human nature, and so on.  
 In this situation, some individuals might care little about the items on the 
previous list.  They might, for instance, prefer making art, collecting stamps, or 
philosophising to having a sufficient amount of all the listed items.  As a result, the 
ideal life-plans which their advisors would create for them might not include many of 
the universal constituents of well-being.  These individuals could be happyg even if 
their lives were poor on well-being (Haybron, 2008, p. 81).  
Of course, most people probably do prefer to have most of the constituents of 
objective well-being present in their lives (Foot, 2001, p. 88). These individuals 
would be happyg according to ADHYWLS only if their lives had a high level of 
                                               
30 This will also depend on the version of ADHYWLS in question.  As noted above, according to some 
versions of the view, the ideal life-plans will take into account objective evaluative facts about good 
lives.  This would make it trivially true that a happy life must contain a high level of well-being. 
31 Parfit (1984, pp. 493–502) famously distinguishes such theories from hedonist and desire-
satisfaction views of well-being. 
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objective well-being.32 This is why the well-being of these individuals would be 
important for their happinessg, and why their happinessg would be important for their 
well-being (Haybron, 2008, p. 53). 
 Finally, some views of well-being claim that well-being consists of the 
satisfaction of one’s desires. According to these views, living a life with a high level 
of well-being might not require more than happinessg as described by ADHYWLS.33    
 
(iii) The Reason-Giving and Explanatory Roles of Happinessg. Daniel Haybron has 
recently argued that our everyday concept of happiness serves several functions in the 
ordinary discourse (Haybron, 2003, sec. 3.5; Haybron, 2008, ch. 3, sec. 4).  Because 
of this, any plausible theory of happiness should be able to explain why the concept of 
happiness can serve these practical roles.  Can ADHYWLS do so? 
 Why do we then talk about happiness?  Firstly, we often appeal to 
considerations about happiness in making important decisions.  We consider the fact 
that a certain career will make us happy to be a reason to pursue that career.  
Secondly, we often utilise happiness in assessing how well someone is doing.  We 
often assume that highly successful people are happy (other things being equal), and 
that people who are unhappy have failed to achieve their central goals.  Thirdly, we 
use happiness to predict the behaviour of others.  For example, if someone is 
unhappy, we know that they are unlikely to be good company at a dinner party.   
Finally, we refer to happiness in explaining the actions of others.  For instance, a 
person’s unhappiness can be used to explain why she has made major changes in her 
life. 
                                               
32 ADHYWLS would thus explain why happinessg has prudential value for most people, i.e., why 
happiness in this sense is important for most of us (Haybron, 2003, sec. 4.3). 
33 Haybron (2007) argues that there need not even be a match between Whole Life Satisfaction and 
subjective notions of well-being.  This is because Whole Life Satisfaction views take into account 
satisfaction of a wider range of conative attitudes than the subjectivist views of well-being.  
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Could happinessg be used for these purposes in the ordinary discourse, if 
ADHYWLS were the correct account of this form of happiness?  Firstly, in that case, 
we would have in most cases reasons to pursue our happinessg. After all, our 
happiness would then be a matter of our life matching a life-plan that a more 
knowledgeable version of ourselves would create for us out our desires, likes, goals, 
values, and the like.  Being happy would therefore mean that our most important ends 
would be achieved.  So, if we have reasons to achieve our goals, then we would have 
reasons to pursue happinessg as understood by ADHYWLS.   
 Equally clearly, happinessg as understood by ADHYWLS could be used to 
measure how well someone is doing in their lives.  After all, happiness would then 
just consist of one’s actual life measuring up to a life-plan that would be ideal for one.  
This understanding of happinessg could also be used for prediction and 
explanation.  We can assume that other people share many of our ends such as 
enjoyment, human interaction, meaningful work, and so on.  If we knew that they are 
unhappyg, we would also know that their lives would not match up to their life-plans 
in which the previous ends would be achieved.  This would tell us many useful things 
about the lives of these agents, and their psychological states.  This information could 
be used to explain why a given unhappy agent, for instance, seeks to change her life.  
We could also use it to predict the behaviour of such an agent. 
 
(iv) Happinessg and the Experience Machine. Laura Sizer has argued that Life 
Satisfaction theories lead to implausible consequences in Nozick’s Experience 
Machine case (Sizer, 2010, p. 140; Nozick, 1974, pp. 42–45).  Imagine a virtual 
reality machine which would give you experiences such that you could not distinguish 
them from real experiences.  Because of these experiences, it would also seem to you 
that your life went according to your ideal life-plan.  It would be as if things went well 
 27 
with your friends, that you had successful career, and so on.  Yet, none of this would 
actually be happening.  You would furthermore forget that you were in the machine. 
 Sizer claims that, because Life Satisfaction views measure happiness in terms 
of whether an agent judges her life to measure up to her life-plan, these views would 
entail that agents would be just as happyg in the Experience Machine.  After all, the 
agent would make the very same judgments in the machine as she would in the real 
life.  However, many people think that being happyg cannot be merely a matter of 
believing that one’s life matches up to one’s life-plan.  One’s life must actually match 
up to the life-plan as well. 
 ADHYWLS can avoid this problem.  The agent’s idealised version, A+, would 
know whether or not the actual agent A is in the Experience Machine.  This would be 
a relevant factor in A+’s assessment of whether A’s life matches up to A+’s ideal life-
plan for her.  If the plan which A+ forms for A on the basis of A’s goals includes real 
achievements and relationships, then A+ would not think that A’s life in the 
Experience Machine matches up to her life-plan.  So, such a person would not be 
happyg in the Experience Machine on this view.  
Yet, someone else might value the relevant experiences themselves more than 
anything more genuine.  Such a person’s life-plan might be satisfied in the Experience 
Machine.  ADHYWLS would classify this kind of agents as happyg.  However, as 
explained above, this view wouldn’t classify everyone in the Experience Machine as 
happyg.  So, ADHYWLS can deal with Sizer’s objection in a satisfying way.  
 
(v) Feldman’s Final Objections 
In this last sub-section, I want to address three remaining objections which Feldman 
presents to all forms of Whole Life Satisfaction theories. 
 28 
 The first problem is that people’s actual judgments about how their life 
matches up to their life-plan change more frequently than their state of happiness 
could ever change (Feldman, 2008, sec. 3; Feldman 2010, sec. 5.3; see also Haybron, 
2007, sec. 3.3; Haybron, 2008, pp. 86–91).  For instance, it has been demonstrated 
that trivial changes to the environment in which one makes life-satisfaction judgments 
affect one’s judgments (Nettle, 2005, pp. 34–36).  If a subject finds a ‘lost’ dollar in 
the experimental setting, she is likely to indicate greater satisfaction with her life than 
she would have done otherwise.  Because of this, our actual judgments about life-
satisfaction cannot be reliable indicators of happinessg.  
ADHYWLS will not suffer from such problems.  It relies on hypothetical 
judgments of an idealised version of the agent.  Because these hypothetical judgments 
are based on being accurately informed about the agent’s real life and her stable 
conative attitudes, these judgments would not change from one moment to another.   
In fact, we do not need to think that they are made from any real temporal perspective 
at all.  Likewise, these judgments could not be affected by trivial changes in the 
agent’s actual circumstances.  So, ADHYWLS is able to avoid these so-called 
instability and lability problems. 
 
In the end of his article, Feldman presents two further counter-examples Whole Life 
Satisfaction theories (Feldman, 2008, pp. 236–237; Feldman, 2010, p. 87, fn. 36, and 
pp. 88–89).  The first of these concerns an agent who is also badly confused about the 
actual circumstances of her life.  For instance, we can consider Jim Carrey’s character 
Truman from the film The Truman Show.  Unbeknownst to him, Truman is in fact 
living in the centre of a constructed reality television show.  Thus, even if he does not 
know it, Truman’s relationships or projects are not real because all of the other 
participants in them are merely acting.   
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Despite this, many people would probably judge that Truman is living a happy 
life within the show.   However, were Truman to make an informed judgment about 
his life, he might come to judge it to be less than satisfactory.  So, Feldman claims 
that even the hypothetical versions of the Whole Life Satisfaction theory could not 
accommodate the happiness of uninformed people like Truman. 
ADHYWLS can deal with this case in the same way as it dealt with the 
previous cases.   In some cases, the idealised version of the agent can come to judge 
that most of the agent’s fundamental goals (including the one of having many 
pleasurable experiences) will be achieved only if the agent does not have an accurate 
idea of her circumstances.34  As a result, the ideal life-plan for this person would not 
require her to be informed.  This would mean that this person’s ignorant life would 
match up to her ideal life-plan, and thus ignorance would be one constituent of her 
happinessg. 
The same can be said about Feldman’s second case. In it, Tammy is glum and 
miserable because she has a mistaken picture of how well her life is actually going.  If 
Tammy were to become more informed about her life, she might judge that her life 
actually matches up quite well with her life-plan.  Feldman claims that intuitively 
Tammy is unhappy even if the hypothetical versions of the Whole Life Satisfaction 
views would thus lead to the opposite conclusion.35 
This case might show that our intuitions about happiness are in part confused 
because of the different senses of ‘happiness’ (see also footnote 14, and the end of 
                                               
34 These cases might be rare.  It could be claimed that there is an even more ideal life-plan for agents 
like Truman that include becoming more informed, starting a new life on the basis of the new 
information, and thus become ‘genuinely happy’.  This objection relies on the intuition that Truman is 
not initially genuinely happy (contrary to what Feldman’s example states).  This thought would not be 
a problem for my view.  It would only correspond to the possible constraint on the ideal life-plans that 
they be informed.  However, if one does believe that Truman can be genuinely happy, then the above 
view just explains how my view could accommodate that intuition too.  Of course, one could also say 
that, even if Truman is happy, he is not living a desirable life. One could then use the informed life-
plans to account for desirability, and the non-informed plans to account for happiness.  
35 Here is one case which AWLS (and possibly even HWLS) seems to give the right results. That view 
would claim that Tammy is unhappy because of the displeasure she experiences as a result of making 
her (false) judgment about how her life is going. 
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sec. 3 above). Perhaps we do not want to say that Tammy is happy because we are 
thinking of the phenomenological happinessp here instead of the more global 
happinessg. In the latter sense of the term, it might not be so implausible to say that 
Tammy is at least not completely unhappy because, unbeknownst to her, ‘she is not a 
sinner’, ‘she is well liked by others’, and her life ‘matches up with her important 
ideals’ (Feldman, 2008, p. 237). 
Of course, it might also be fair to say that she would be much happierg if she 
knew all of this.  This would enable her to enjoy these achievements.  However, 
ADHYWLS can accommodate this thought too.  Tammy’s goal might be to live an 
informed life and to experience enjoyment and satisfaction.  If this were true, then 
Tammy+ would not judge that Tammy’s life completely matches up to the ideal life-
plan which she has for her.  This would mean that ADHYWLS would come to the 
same conclusion as Feldman about this case; namely, that Tammy is not happy.  
As a result of this, I conclude that ADHYWLS is able to deal with all of 
Feldman’s objections.  It is therefore an improved version of the most popular view of 
happiness.  Because of this, ADHYWLS is well worth investigating further.  
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